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Social groups that fear market liberalisation and competition
for jobs are also more likely to mistrust the EU.
by Blog Admin
Public opinion on European integration varies significantly across EU Member States. Based
on data from the European Social Survey, Kristel Jacquier argues that one of the key factors
in the growth of negative attitudes toward the EU is the perceived detrimental effect of market
liberalisation and labour market flexibility on low skilled workers. Highly skilled workers are
significantly more likely to support European integration than those in elementary occupations.
What are the determinants of  public support f or the European Union? Using individual- level
data f rom two rounds of  the European Social Survey, we can see that in every member
state, socio-economic characteristics shape pref erences on European matters. It can be argued that the
polit ical agenda of  the Union has become more and more detrimental to low skilled workers in the labour
market, which leads them to be less and less supportive of  f urther integration.
How the European Union became a distributional issue
During the 1950s and the 1960s, a permissive consensus existed in Europe. A large majority of  cit izens
displayed tacit support f or the European process. As a result of  this public disinterest, polit ical elites have
been able to pursue their own policy interests. Af ter the signing of  the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986,
cit izen support f or European integration started to rise and reached a peak in 1991. By then European
integration was considered a purely economic arrangement that brought about macro-economic stability
and, to some extent, prosperity.
In the af termath of  the Maastricht Treaty, public opinion was conf ronted by a more complex situation. The
polit ical jurisdictions of  the EU were extended; the Union now had inf luence over social policy,
environmental and def ence matters. The year 1992 witnessed a sharp drop in public support. Since then
public opinion on European membership has stabilised to leave a sizeable minority of  supporters (the rest
being hostile or indif f erent). The implementation of  Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) exacerbated
worries about European issues. From then on, not only was the European Central Bank delegated the sole
authority to conduct monetary policy; budgetary policy would also be constrained by the Stability and
Growth Pact. Such loss of  sovereignty will be a burning issue when European authorit ies decide to adopt
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union to overcome the
sovereign-debt crisis. At present, f urther integration of  the Union boils down to reinf orcing constraints. As
f or development plans (the Lisbon strategy, and Europe 2020), the European Council f ocuses mainly on
deepening competit ion and liberalisation, and calls f or “structural ref orms”.
Why do cit izens mistrust the EU?
Two motives of  distrust towards the EU can be suggested: the loss of  sovereignty and the economic
liberalisation process. The f irst motive is linked to the European Monetary Union (EMU). Countries which
adopted EMU have to bear constraints on both monetary and budgetary policies. And f or the others, “more
integration” might stand f or the adoption of  the common currency. Consequently cit izens who f ear a loss
of  sovereignty are unlikely to call f or more European integration. Secondly, liberalisation is expected to
harm the less skilled. When the labour market becomes more f lexible, the risk of  an individual losing their
job becomes higher f or unskilled workers. Considering those issues, it is reasonable to expect less
competit ive cit izens to f ear both a cut in government spending and a surge in labour market f lexibility.
Who are integration supporters, and what can that tell us?
Empirical results tend to prove that the social groups who lack support f or f urther European integration are
the same groups who tradit ionally f ear liberalisation: i.e. low skilled workers. Conversely, managers and
prof essionals f avour integration. Among the EU 15 states (the members of  the EU prior to the eastern
enlargements in 2004 and 2007), the gap f rom one ISCO category to the other is wide. The likelihood of
supporting European integration is 45 per cent lower f or elementary workers compared to prof essionals.
The gaps are much less pronounced among eastern member states (a 23 per cent drop in the support f or
elementary workers compared to prof essionals). Even though occupational clusters are taken into account,
the highest income categories remain signif icantly more in f avour of  the European process than medium or
low income ones.
Unemployed people do not have distinct pref erences f rom workers; this might be due to heterogeneity
among the individuals of  the group. Union membership is signif icant and as predicted, unionised workers
are less supportive of  f urther integration than their non-unionised counterparts. Additionally, the partisan
af f iliation conf irms that in European polit ics, socio-economic f orces are not a mere ref lection of  the
lef t/right spectrum. European integration appears as a polit ical dimension in itself .
These f indings are consistent with the hypothesis that the economic status of  agents plays a crucial role
in explaining cross-sectional variations in public support f or the European process in every member state.
Such a tendency is likely to persist if  the European polit ical agenda continues to promote liberalisation and
budgetary constraints. It has to be noted that when European issues are concerned, pref erences are not
aligned to tradit ional partisanship, or well-known dimensions such as economic or cultural drivers. Although
changes in party systems have not occurred until now, European integration appears increasingly like a
polit ical cleavage.
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